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Abstract: This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and 
looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ 
without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global 
performance indicators as a growing form of social control that appears to have certain 
advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against various forms of 
international regulatory authority. This article discusses the ways in which Zürn’s diagnosis of 
governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise of such ranking systems. These play into 
favored paradigms that give information and market performance greater social acceptance 
than rules, laws, and directives designed by international organizations. We discuss how and 
why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the evidence regarding 
their effects on actors’ behaviors. Zürn’s book provides a useful context for understanding the 
rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke 




Global governance has never seemed more necessary, and yet so under attack. 
Economies around the world are more dependent than ever on decisions made beyond their 
borders. International human rights norms have suffered attacks from multiple directions. The 
very habitability of the planet will be influenced by emissions guidelines that need collective 
effort and management.  
At the same time, evidence of opposition to distant sources of external, international 
and ‘global’ authority is abundant. The United States is a prime example of a major 
democracy who once took a leadership role in international trade institutions but now 
challenges both multilateralism and rule-oriented dispute settlement. Critiques that 
international institutions from the International Criminal Court to the International Monetary 
Fund, are imperialist have become increasingly resonant in much of the world.  International 
institutions have been crucial in managing and deepening the processes of interdependence 
and accountability in the age of globalization.  But the very relevance of global problems has 
made collective action both important and controversial. As Zürn points out in his book, A 
Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation, legitimacy is crucial, 
but it is far from guaranteed.1  
Challenges to the legitimacy of international organizations come from rising powers 
who seek greater voice and different goals from those instantiated in the Liberal World Order, 
as well as from developing countries who resent accepting rules made by imperialist powers. 
Legitimacy challenges also come from within the liberal core, where populist opposition to 
internationalism has impacted politics and policies. Western disarray in NATO, the refusal of 
the US to support multilateralism, and growing civil society skepticism have all contributed to 
the legitimacy crisis of international institutions. 
 
1 Zürn 2018. 
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International organizations (IOs) have been struggling to respond to these challenges 
to their authority. Zürn’s work points to several such efforts. Some IOs have embraced 
transparency, opened their decision-making to scrutiny, and invited broader participation. 
Such moves aim to strengthen a consensus among societal actors to support international 
institutional deepening. But traditional narratives inviting participation and touting 
transparency are not the most creative moves of modern IOs. Today, many are packaging and 
deploying information in new ways to achieve their traditional ends.  
The dilemmas of modern global governance have made use of what we call global 
performance indicators (GPIs) increasingly attractive. Global performance indicators are 
defined as a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or 
projected performance of different units.2 IOs have long produced data, but in the recent past 
they have promulgated overtly strategic state rating and ranking systems that package and 
deploy information intentionally to advocate policy and to influence its implementation. 
Rather than double down on top down regulatory commands, IOs have engaged in this form 
of information politics that governs through comparison. Here is the basic pattern: the 
organization creates a quantifiable (or quasi-quantifiable) index that compares the 
performance of multiple states within a region or more broadly; they make the index publicly 
and easily available, and publish it on a regular predictable schedule. The measures are 
typically explicitly normative, policy focused, and are deployed to influence state-level 
outcomes. GPIs can take several forms, the most influential of which use numbers or grades 
to rate or rank state performance, compressing enormous variance into a simplified scale.3 
Ordinal categories are often used to produce (un)flattering peer group comparisons as well. 
 
2 Davis et al. 2012; Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012; Davis, Merry, and Kingsbury 2015; Merry and 
Conley 2011. 
3 Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019. 
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Zürn’s book analyzes the context in which the turn to information politics of this kind 
makes sense for authoritative IOs facing challenges to their legitimacy. We build on his 
analysis by pointing to GPIs as a technology for threading the needle of the governance 
dilemma. The most clever organizations increasingly try to govern using information politics 
rather than old-style command and control. Zürn show that IOs try to justify their hierarchical 
authority through various technocratic and participatory narratives; we add that they also shift 
to information politics that avoid the appearance of a directive, and are therefore more likely 
fly beneath the radar of public contestation. We explain why assessing and ranking states’ 
performance is potentially impactful and provide an example from a beleaguered international 
financial institution, the World Bank. GPIs do not eliminate the contestation of authority, but 
they do help to camouflage that authority among the everyday pressures of politics, the media 
and the market. 
 
The rise of indicators: an informational response to a governing dilemma 
When IOs face challenges to their authority, they have incentives to develop tools that 
garner less resistance. GPIs are one such tool. According to a recent study, GPI growth has 
been nearly exponential. Approximately 20 GPIs in use in the late 1990s; by the next decade, 
the number had roughly quadrupled, and in the next 15 years it more than tripled.4 This 
proliferation responded to growing demands for policy-relevant performance data, facilitated 
by the fact that information was becoming ever easier to collect, process and disseminate.5 
Zürn’s analysis suggests global performance assessments may have intensified because of the 
heightened politicization of the issues and institutions of global governance. 
 
4 Kelley and Simmons 2019. 
5 Arndt 2008; Arndt and Oman 2006; Malito, Umbach, and Bhuta 2018. 
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Why use indicators? IOs are attracted to them for a number of reasons. First, their 
deployment is a nearly imperceptible shift in the repertoire of traditional IO functions. IOs 
have collected, curated, and circulated data for decades. Information provision was one of the 
functions Robert Keohane cited in his seminal work explaining why international institutions 
exist in the first place.6 One reason weak international institutions can enhance domestic 
accountability is by providing compliance data.7 From the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators to the UN’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database to the Food and Agricultural 
Organization’s Forestry Database, collecting and organizing data has long been a core 
competency of IOs. Governance by assessment and ranking, that is, by GPIs, was a subtle 
process that could be considered an outgrowth of a long-accepted IO function. Soon it would 
seem natural that the World Bank would rank every country in the world from top to bottom 
on an Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index,8 and that the United Nations would do the same 
with respect to a Gender Inequality Index.9 After all, what could be more legitimate than IOs 
producing information?  
GPIs are not simply data in the neutral sense; they are deployed to set standards, 
establish policy agendas, and ultimately to influence legislation, regulations, behavior, and 
outcomes. Their labels are explicitly and increasingly normative.  Their presentation invites 
audiences to ask, ‘how’s my state doing?’ often inviting audiences browsing online 
interactively to shuffle various sub-indicators to view how one’s state (and its competitors) 
perform according to various criteria. Comparisons are utterly integral to such exercises: the 
OECD’s ‘Better Life Index’ invites viewers to ‘compare well-being across countries, based on 
11 topics the OECD has identified as essential, in the areas of material living conditions and 
 
6 Keohane 1982. 
7 Dai 2005. 
8 See the rankings at http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings.  
9 See the rankings at:  http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII.  
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quality of life.’10 About two-thirds of active GPIs employ explicit top-to-bottom ranking 
systems, and over a third create clear normative categories or performance tiers, usually in 
addition to a ranking or rating.11 These features render GPIs a potent tool for producing social 
control through the pressure of comparative information. 
Experience suggests comparative indicators are a tried and true tool of influence. IOs 
can look to an impressive history of effective ranking systems used by private actors. Bond 
rating agencies are a notoriously powerful example.12 But so are everyday raters such as US 
News and World Reports on colleges and universities,13 and Consumer Reports on everything 
from toasters to automobiles.14 In short, there are plenty of good examples that are highly 
effective in nudging households, investors and even states toward touted outcomes. 
Perhaps the major reason IOs found rankings a convenient technology of governance 
is because GPIs address what Zürn suggests could be at the core of their legitimacy crisis: 
trying to be effective without being overly directive. Ranking systems do no not work in quite 
the same top-down way as rules, laws, and directives, at least not to the naked eye. They are 
harnesses rather than commands. GPIs represent standards desired by the rater, and if the rater 
is salient and respected enough, social dynamics of competition, reputational concerns, and 
status obsessions take over.  
Most attractive of all, the deployment of GPIs preserves, even enhances, perceptions 
of an IO’s competence without raising legitimacy red flags. GPIs leverage expertise without 
issuing commands, and if they work as hoped, they burnish perceptions of competence on an 
issue without generating offense at external officiousness. They can deflect the criticisms 
about such pressure to third parties, such as investors or aid donors, who are at liberty to use 
 
10 OECD, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/.  
11 Kelley and Simmons 2019. 
12 Sinclair 2008. 
13 Espeland and Sauder 2007. 
14 Simonsohn 2011. 
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the ranking to guide their resource decisions.15 For these reasons, GPIs have proved an 
attractive technology of governance for IOs facing the legitimacy dilemma. They change the 
dynamics of ‘rules’ and ‘ruling.’ In short, GPIs are a handy technology to supplement and 
sometimes replace compliance politics with information politics.  
 
Indicators as technologies of governance: why they work 
But do GPIs really ‘work’  as effective technologies of governance? New research is 
emerging to answer this question, and, while it is limited to a few policy domains, we can 
advance some general if tentative responses.16  
Why should governments care about a simple ranking or rating? GPIs work through 
social pressure, which is applied by making peer comparisons. All social pressure operates 
through a change in the informational environment, targeting an entity’s reputation or status. 
Sometimes officials (or bureaucrats, or citizens) care about reputation and status as an end in 
itself,17 and sometimes they may be concerned about material consequences (foreign 
assistance, investment). When they know their state is being ranked, and that their 
performance will be splashed across the internet, they experience social pressure to conform 
to the criteria established by the rater. In anticipation of regularized rounds of rankings, they 
may even internalize the values of the rater, and eventually self-regulate. As Deitelhoff and 
Daase suggest, whether this form of pressure is ‘good’ or ‘benevolent’ is – to say the least – 
debatable. Our point here is that it can have very real effects on the targeted state through a 
status mechanism.18 
 
15 See the policy evaluation criteria for the Millennium Development Corporation at: 
https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-selection-criteria-methodology-fy18.  
16 Bisbee et al. 2019; Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019; Honig and Weaver 2019; Kelley 2017; Kelley 
and Simmons 2015; Morse 2019. 
17 Adler-Nissen 2014; Chwieroth 2013; Nelson 2017. 
18 Deitelhoff and Daase 2020. 
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GPI creators including IOs seek to engage this concern with status and reputation by 
leveraging comparative information among peers.19 Explicit comparisons create contexts in 
which judgments are formed and identities are established and reinforced.20 They foster 
‘commensuration,’ or ‘the comparison of different entities according to a common metric,’ as 
a way of making highly-simplified sense of the world.21 Moreover, the media is particularly 
fond of reporting relative rankings; in numerous interviews GPI creators frankly acknowledge 
that they created such indexes precisely to attract media attention.22  
One source of GPI power is the credibility and authority of its creator. What makes 
some GPI creators more authoritative than others? The social psychology literature suggests 
that one source of legitimate authority is trust, which, in turn, develops out of a perception 
that an actor is fair, knowledgeable, and/or competent.23 GPI creators also gain authority 
based on their assumed competence and expertise.24 Network centrality may matter as well. 
Actors centrally located in a social and political network are better able to set agendas25 and 
impact information flows,26 which facilitates data collection and GPI dissemination.27  It 
would be naïve to assert, of course, that leverage over resources plays no role. Direct control 
over resources and indirect influence over third parties that control resources are important 
reasons states pay attention to ratings and rankings as well, as Vincent Pouliot notes.28 For 
these reasons – epistemic and quasi-coercive – major IOs are well-positioned to influence 
 
19 In one exceptionally ambitious effort to exercise social control through ranking, China reportedly has 
pilot programs to rate each and every citizen according to a form of “social credit.” See reports at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186.  
20 Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004. 
21 Broome and Quirk 2015; Espeland and Sauder 2007; Espeland and Stevens 1998; Schueth 2011. 
22 This theme was evident in a series of 23 interviews conducted by the authors in Washington DC, 
August 12-14, 2014.  
23 Espeland and Sauder 2007; Rieh 2002; Simonsohn 2011; Wilson 1983. 
24 Monks and Ehrenberg 1999. 
25 Carpenter 2011. 
26 Borgatti and Cross 2003. 
27 Stone 2002. 
28 Pouliot 2020. 
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agendas, set status competition in motion, and judge performance better than just about any 
other corporate body.  
The genius of ‘governing’ through GPIs is that IOs can set the criteria for 
performance, and then tap some very strong competitive dynamics. GPI information 
reverberates in domestic politics, especially when amplified by the popular or social media.29 
Iterative assessment and ranking exercises incentivize government bureaucrats to take IOs’ 
expert advice directly into account in their policymaking.30 GPIs activate transnational 
pressures and influence how third parties such as foreign investors, donors or other states 
respond to – or are anticipated to respond to – the ratings.31 Such systems appear to operate 
nearly hands-free, by enabling improved domestic accountability and what might be thought 
of as market discipline. This is a highly attractive governing technology for IOs whose 
legitimacy is palpably on the wane.  
 
Example: The World Bank and the Ease of Doing Business index  
The World Bank is a telling case study. As Zürn points out, politicization surrounding 
the Bank’s policies intensified over the course of the 1990s, culminating in the Battle in 
Seattle. The Bank had long tapped its expertise to justify loan conditionality, using a 
technocratic narrative – ‘we know development’ – to try and coerce better governance from 
its clients. For whatever reasons – including growing skepticism of interference of 
international financial institutions in traditional areas of state sovereignty32 – tools of 
economic leverage were seen as undesirable and/or ineffective ways to encourage such 
change. Instead the Bank intentionally chose a communication device that leverages the views 
 
29 Carpenter 2007; McCombs and Shaw 1972. 
30 Masaki and Parks 2020. 
31 Bisbee et al. 2019; Morse 2019. 
32 Zürn 2018. 
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of other actors to stoke pressure for regulatory change, even while distancing themselves 
from the possibility of policy failures. Rankings served that purpose: unlike strict forms of 
conditionality, they nudge performance in the international financial institutions’ favored 
direction without directly accepting responsibility for negative outcomes.33  
Publication of the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) index was not without controversy. 
Praised by western businesses, it met with skepticism by another major IO, the International 
Labor Organization,34 and at least one major state, China.35 The EDB includes such sub-
indicators as a count of days it takes to start a business, days for a contract to be enforced in 
the courts, how many procedures are required to get a business license, and the ease of 
winding up a bankruptcy.  On these and a few other criteria, the Bank ranks states from top to 
bottom.36  
Over the past decade, policy makers around the world have spoken and acted as 
though the EDB matters greatly.37 Countries openly publicize their plans to undertake 
reforms. Georgia – whom some have criticized for gaming the system – announced concerted 
efforts to rise from 100th to the top 20 in two years.38 National officials in Yemen,39 
Portugal,40 Mauritius,41 El Salvador,42 and India have also highlighted EDB as motivating 
reforms. Some of these same countries have at varying times been among the most vociferous 
critics of international financial institutions. As time went on, researchers started to take these 
 
33 Best 2014. 
34 See the critique of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00171.pdf.  
35 In 2013 a formal review (Independent Doing Business Report Review Panel, 24 June 2013, 
Washington D.C.) commenced following pressure from China which was unhappy with its rankings, discussed 
tensions over the rankings and once again recommended that they be removed. The Bank ignored the 
recommendation. 
36 See the World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings.  
37 Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018. 
38 Schueth 2011. 
39 The World Bank Group 2009. 
40 The World Bank Group 2008. 
41 The World Bank Group 2009. 
42 The World Bank Group 2007. 
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indicators as data – ground-level truth about the business environment43 – eliding further the 
distinction between ‘truth’ and social pressure function that originally gave rise to their 
promulgation. As states began to jockey to ascend the rankings by implementing very specific 
EDB-consistent reforms,44  it became increasingly apparent that the Bank had successfully 
harnessed competitive dynamics to secure its policy preferences.  
New experimental evidence suggests that rankings as a strategic way of presenting 
performance information are impactful. Controlling for other kinds of economic information, 
relative EDB rankings influence investors’ assessments of where it is desirable to make 
investments. Similarly public attitudes on reform priorities have been shown to respond to 
information about poor EDB rankings vis-à-vis a salient competitor.45 As the Bank itself has 
noted, ‘The main advantage of showing a single rank: it is easily understood by politicians, 
journalists, and development experts and therefore created pressure to reform. As in sports, 
once you start keeping score everyone wants to win.’46 Conservative think tanks concur that 
there is something highly motivating about rankings: CATO’s Director speculates that 
‘Stripping the ordinal rankings and “reforming” the report’s methodology would have the 
effect of completely destroying the report’s credibility and usefulness as a policy tool.’47 As if 
on cue, one informant in the investment consulting industry exclaimed (anonymously) that the 
EDB Index was one of the most effective things the World Bank had ever done.48 
The World Bank is far from the only IO to address the dilemma of governance facing 
a legitimacy deficit with the implicit governance of GPIs. This strategy is pervasive and 
 
43 Corcoran and Gillanders 2015. 
44 Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019. 
45 Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019. 
46 Djankov et al. 2005, 1. (accessed through the WayBack Machine, posting at 19 February 2006). 
47 See Steve Hanke, Director of the CATO Institute’s Troubled Currencies Project, in response to a 
Chinese-led effort to remove the rankings statement at 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/singapore-leads-way-doing-business. 
48 Anonymous interview with authors, August 2014. 
 12 
growing. The European Institute uses the ‘European Gender Equality Index’ to incentivize 
attention to employment gaps by gender;49 the World Intellectual Property Organization is 
‘Energizing the World with Innovation’ using its ‘Global Innovation Index,’50 and the 
International Telecommunications Union has deployed its Global Cyber Security Index to 
measure ‘the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness.’51 
Whether and to what extent these assessment regimes affect outcomes is a vibrant area of 
current research. Such schemes seem to be a pervasive response to the dilemma of governance 
in an age of growing politicization and diminishing IO legitimacy.  
 
Conclusions 
Michael Zürn’s Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and 
Contestation, is an insightful diagnosis of the dilemmas faced by IOs as they try to deal with 
global problems on the one hand and face growing politicization and resistance to their 
authority on the other. States and societies have certainly chafed under the delegation of 
important aspect of decision making to IOs. Rational institutions, theories of hands-tying and 
rational explanations for delegation appear to be blunt analytical tools in the face of recent 
revolts against the authority of IOs to govern.  
Zürn’s book is intriguing precisely because IOs face growing pressures to govern 
creatively. What they do matters, and the more it matters, to the more resistance can be 
expected to their extranational exhortations and commands. If international legitimacy is in 
question, there are new incentives to expand the repertoire of governing responses. GPIs fit 
the bill: they create an impression of voluntary compliance with the exertion of minimal 
 
49 See the EU Institute at https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index 
50 See the WIPO at http://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4330. 
51 See ITU at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx. 
 13 
external enforcement. Research on the conditions under which GPIs are effective substitutes 
for (or complements to) traditional governance approaches helps to address the dilemma that 
Michael Zürn has exposed.  
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